Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability by Perona, Ángeles J.
 




Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability










Ángeles J. Perona, « Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability », European Journal of
Pragmatism and American Philosophy [Online], XII-1 | 2020, Online since 16 June 2020, connection on
26 June 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/1862  ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/ejpap.
1862 
This text was automatically generated on 26 June 2020.
Author retains copyright and grants the European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy right
of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.
Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive
Vulnerability
Richard Rorty as an Example
Ángeles J. Perona
AUTHOR'S NOTE
This research has been carried out within the framework of the Cognitive Vulnerability,
Verisimilitude and Truth (FFI2017-84826-P) research project and the Rationality, knowledge
and action Complutense Research Group (930664). I appreciate all the comments
received regarding a previous version of this text by my project partners, especially
José Mª Ariso, Rosa Calcaterra, Isabel Gamero, Óscar González Castán, Marcia Martínez,
Javier Vilanova and Astrid Wagner. For the same reason I would like to thank Guido
Baggio, Michella Bella and Giovanni Maddalena.
 
1. Some Ideas from Rorty’s Thinking: Ethnocentrism,
Rationality and Solidarity
1 Let us start by recalling some ideas that stand out in Rorty’s thinking.
2 1. Rorty’s harsh criticism of the inherited philosophical tradition does not leave a gap
of  extreme  scepticism  but  a  resignification  of  all  cognitive  activity  (starting  with
science  and  ending  with  philosophy),  which  can  be  understood  as  voices  in  the
conversation of humankind. 
3 2.  As  far  as  philosophy  is  concerned,  Rorty  considers  it  necessary  to  abandon  the
traditional attempt to offer a definitive vocabulary, capable of providing normatively
unappealable descriptions of knowledge, truth, good, justice, etc. 
4 3. With regard to this, he confers to philosophy the task of inventing vocabularies. This
is what he himself does when making his proposal, which, to differentiate himself from
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any realism or relativism, he calls ethnocentrism. Its core is a contingentism that could
be summed up in the theory that only descriptions of procedures that a specific society
– ours – follows in one area of inquiry or another regarding rationality and its norms
(such as truth or justification) can be given (Rorty 1991: 23 et sq.). 
5 4.  Rorty  himself  confesses  that  he  prefers  to  consider  his proposal  as  more  of  a
narrative of maturation than a theory of rationality (Rorty 2000a: 24). The reason for
this lies in his idea that any known theory of rationality incurs, in one way or another,
in  metaphysical  realism  and  a  conception  of  the  norms  of  rationality  that  fall
(manifestly  or  surreptitiously)  into  the  categories  of  necessity  and,  ultimately,  of
absolute foundation. 
6 However,  a  quick  look  at  the  history  of  philosophy  shows  reflections  on  human
rationality  that  are  neither  necessarist  nor  fundamentalist.  Failure  to  grasp  the
difference of moderate scepticism (for example of Hume) or the various fallibilisms that
populate twentieth century philosophy (from Popper to Putnam) can only be explained
by  what  Richard  Bernstein  calls  Cartesian  Anxiety.  It  is  a  philosophical  condition
consisting  of  addressing  issues  in  exclusive  dualistic  terms.  Something  that,  as
Bernstein rightly points out,  Rorty helped to combat,  despite incurring in it,  to his
regret, in some cases (Bernstein 1983: 60 et sq.; Bernstein 1986: 46-57). Therefore, when
Rorty makes statements like the previous one, he actually does so with the idea that
contingentism is either professed as he understands it in his ethnocentric proposal or it
falls into necessitarianism. 
7 5. That same condition explains why Rorty affirms that his pragmatism does not have a
relativistic epistemology, because it has none (Rorty 1991: 24). However, reading his
work is sufficient to see that he does elaborate and staunchly defends a conception of
rationality  and  an  epistemology  that  contains  notions  of  truth  and  justification
belonging to  the coherentist  and fallibilist  type.  In  fact,  he  elaborates  his  proposal
through a continuous debate with other thinkers, many of who present philosophies
that also belong to that third option which is fallibilism. However, this path has been
trodden  by  many,  so,  once  on  it,  it  is  worth  noting,  even  briefly,  the  differences
between  the  several  types  of  fallibilism.  In  this  regard,  as  I  will  argue  below,  the
fallibilism sustained by Rorty is pessimistic.
8 6. The previous statement that his pragmatism has no epistemology is followed by the
claim that it has an ethical basis, that which appreciates the value of human inquiry in
cooperation,  which appreciates what each individual  offers the community through
their inquiries. Hence the primacy of the value of solidarity over that of objectivity.
From this perspective governed by solidarity, he understands that inquiring consists of
continuous reweaving of a belief network (Rorty 1991: 26). Furthermore, all inquiry is
interpretation and all thought is recontextualization of beliefs.1
9 This vision of the inquiry is anti-representationalist (with respect to the realism of the
truth), and not sceptical/nihilistic, because he believes in the possibility of a choice
between better and worse options. However, we cannot resort to something alien to
each ethnos to do this. Rorty believes that this conception of the norms of rationality
has the advantage of not claiming “metaphysical activism” (Rorty 1998: 41). In other
words, it frees human beings from the task of inventing false gods: a final arbiter who,
from the point of  view of the Eye of God,  establishes the Truth in an absolute and
necessary way. 
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10 7.  The  fact  is  that  the  primacy of  solidarity  leads  to  what  he  describes  as  Sartre’s
consistent  atheism.  (Rorty  1998:  54,  62).  This  striking  and  interesting  label  refers,
among other things,  to the idea that human rational activities and their norms are
tinged with contingency, as it  could be otherwise since there are no unconditioned
conditions of any human activity. This is a position for which justification is always
limited  to  an  audience,  is  not  necessary,  can  change  and  what  was  true  for  one
audience, will cease to be true for another. In short, rational activities are fallible. That
is how Rorty assumes the impossibility of adopting God’s eye view or the like until the
end.
 
2. Fallibilism, Negative Logic and Cognitive
Vulnerability
11 Rorty’s theory on the impossibility of adopting a divine point of view is common to all
fallibilist models of rationality, which always operate according to what we could call a
negative  logic.  With  this  expression  I  mean  that,  for  fallibilist  epistemologies,  the
recurring  corroboration  of  past  errors  together  with  the  meta-induction  of  the
possibility of future error constitute the centre of the conceptual network that explains
the dynamics of rationality (theory and practice). That is why fallibilist philosophies
leave no error or doubt outside the scope of rational activities (knowledge and action),
as if they were something alien or contrary to them.2 On the contrary, both elements
are within that scope and play a key role.  In this way,  fallibilist  philosophies show
images of what we could call soft rationality. I do not intend to convey any disapproval
with  this  description;  its  function  is  descriptive,  because  I  want  to  highlight  the
differences  of  that  image  of  rationality  in  comparison  with  the  models  of  hard
rationality, those that hold absolute and necessary notions of truth and justification.3
The fact is that for fallibilist perspectives, rational activity of any kind is carried out
and advances not so much through the positive search for truth or for an absolute
foundation free of doubts, but rather through moderate and limited doubt about what
is considered verisimilar at the time (or true in a non-absolute sense) and by trying to
detect  errors.  However,  this  negative logic  does not  necessarily  imply an epistemic
pessimism regarding the human capacity to know aspects of reality, that is, to succeed
in some way.4 
12 To  explain  the  possibility  of  cognitive  success,  fallibilist  philosophies  take  sides
regarding which notion of truth to maintain and that always creates problems, even
today. Some classic fallibilist philosophies opt for a combination of instrumentalism
and a notion of truth. This is the case with Peirce and the idea of truth as convergence
highly criticised by Rorty, that is, as hope that, at the hypothetical end of the research,
the community of researchers would come to an agreement. Another variant of that
combination  is  in  Popper’s  epistemological  Darwinism,  for  which  the  truth  is  a
regulatory ideal that we instinctively pursue.5 More recently, the changes that Putnam
introduced to his realism – from internal (Putnam 1981) to natural or direct (Putnam
1999: 3-20) – are a good reflection of the huge philosophical difficulty of trying to take
charge of all conceptual and evaluative mediations of our cognitive processes without
simultaneously  ending  up  in  some  antirealistic  internism  or  in  some  metaphysical
realism that always seems threatened by the risk of being dogmatic. In the lengthy
debate that  Rorty and Putnam had throughout their  professional  lives,6 the former
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strongly  criticised  the  realistic  proposals  of  the  latter  repeatedly  accusing  him  of
metaphysical relapses. I will come back to this problem later.7
13 All  the  above  shows  that  each  fallibilist  perspective  takes  charge  of  the  limits  of
rational activities and derives consequences on the possibilities of error and cognitive
success that may accompany those of error.  On the other hand, fallibilism has also
shown  the  importance  of  the  reliability  of  our  rational  interactions  with  the
surrounding reality and with others. In short and in general, fallibilisms have opened
the way to a more extensive reflection on the scope of what we might call our cognitive
vulnerability.8 
14 It  is  understood  that  I  do  not  see  cognitive  vulnerability  as  something  that  has  a
negative connotation. That connotation appears in the context of clinical psychology
and indicates that the expression refers to psychological disorders, such as anxiety or
depression, which are caused by the use of certain schemes or patterns of inadequacy,
failure  or  loss.  It  assimilates  cognitive  vulnerability  to  cognitive  distortions  that
generate negative thoughts about oneself, the world and the future.9 
15 Unlike  that  pathological  vision,  I  see  cognitive  vulnerability,  in  fallibilist
epistemologies, as a way to bear in mind the limitations of our cognitive abilities and
the conditions to exercise them. To which it should be added that all  this does not
imply  in  itself  either  the  impossibility  of  cognitive  success,  or  having  a  certain
confidence in our belief systems. This is the case even though the attempts to clarify
this possibility generate enormous difficulties in philosophy (as I have already shown).
The latter, by the way, is another manifestation of cognitive vulnerability.
16 On  the  other  hand,  cognitive  vulnerability  is  a  manifestation  of  general  human
vulnerability,  as  our  belief  systems  are  intertwined  with  life  forms,  in  the
Wittgensteinian sense of the term. Therefore, cognitive vulnerability would in some
way reactivate in the epistemological realm the old and prudent sceptical precept of
“looking carefully” in order to avoid dogmatic illusions; but it also deactivates the most
extreme  scepticism  as  destiny.  Along  with  this,  cognitive  vulnerability  offers  us  a
certain  image  of  ourselves  as  humans,  because  what  would  we  be  like  if  we  were
invulnerable in the cognitive sense and in general? In the cognitive sense, we would be
infallible like a divinity (at least intensively);  in general,  we would be almighty, for
example, like the characters that appear in the comics published by Marvel. In short,
we would be non-human. 
17 Therefore, I understand cognitive vulnerability as a broader category than fallibilism. It
includes  some  type  of  fallibilism,  but  also  other  factors  that  condition  knowledge
processes  and  that  have  been  formulated  by  different  thinkers,  although  not
categorised as manifestations of cognitive vulnerability. 
18 For example, the individual psychological elements that work even in the processes of
choice between scientific  theories.  Thomas S.  Kuhn noted their huge relevance and
wondered  why  the  incidence  of these  subjective  factors  in  scientific  research  was
considered by its critics an index of human weakness instead of the nature of scientific
knowledge. For him they constituted “an index only of the inevitable imperfection of
human  nature”  (Kuhn  1977:  326).  We  would  say  that  they  are  an  index  of  human
vulnerability in general and, therefore, are also constitutive elements of human beings
when they investigate. Furthermore, although Kuhn uses an adjective with a negative
connotation  (“imperfection”),  he  does  not  consider  that  this  draws  dramatic
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consequences in the cognitive level:  neither total loss of objectivity, scepticism, nor
irrationality. It actually points to a redefinition of all epistemic notions involved.
19 Thus, the subjective elements referred to by Kuhn are other factors that are added to
the set of  conditions and limitations of  human cognitive processes;  these are other
elements that give us a better understanding of the cognitively vulnerable productive
dynamics of scientific change. 
20 There are other economic and political elements, which have been repeatedly revealed
by  political  philosophy,  especially  that  elaborated  by  the  Frankfurt-based  Critical
Theory.10 In this case, authors remark that it is important to note how the economic/
political  interests affect the processes and results of the research. Specifically,  they
focus on the interests of the ruling class of capitalist societies. From an epistemological
point of view, these interests are partial and are hidden in knowledge processes under
the impossible presumption of a subject of universal knowledge, capable of separating
itself from such interests. In this way, the results of the research, although presented as
universal truths, would actually be as partial as the socio-economic system they would
serve and legitimise.
21 This  schematic  characterisation  is  enough  to  show  that,  in  this  case,  cognitive
vulnerability is  not linked to epistemic fallibilism, but to an economic and political
order  that  is  presented  by  the  authors  as  undesirable  because  of  the  unfair,
inegalitarian effects it produces. In this case, the general background vulnerability that
we can rebuild does not point to the factum of human psychological faculties (as in the
case of Kuhn), but to the factum of human sociability and interdependence, as well as to
power  relations  (understood  as  domination)  that  go  through all  social  institutions,
including research institutions.
22 Finally, an analysis like that of Miranda Fricker on “epistemic injustice” reveals other
elements that can be considered characteristic of cognitive vulnerability. Following the
trail  of  feminist  epistemology,  Fricker  analyses,  on  the  one  hand,  what  she  calls
testimonial  injustice,  caused by  the  variable  credibility  and reliability  attributed to
some  subjects  of  knowledge  and  not  others.  On  the  other  hand,  she  exposes
hermeneutic injustice which she understands as that which “occurs at a prior stage,
when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage
when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007: 1).11
23 In this case, the general background vulnerability that we can reconstruct is the same
as  in  the  case  of  Critical  Theory,  that  is,  it  has  to  do  with  the  factum of  human
sociability and interdependence and with the relations of domination that also affect
knowledge  processes.  However,  unlike  the  Frankfurt  perspective,  Fricker’s  analysis
focuses on the social power that is exercised, either structurally, or by some agents
over others, depending on the prejudices that urge the conceptions of social identities
in force in each case (for example, the social identity of gender, race, social class, etc.). 
24 As  has  already  been  said,  another  difference  between  the  two  perspectives  is  that
Critical Theory focuses on explaining the way in which economic (capitalist) interests
are hidden in the processes of generating scientific knowledge and therefore favour the
perpetuation of these partial interests and the unjust social and political order that
accompanies  them.  This  would  be  socio-political  harm,  but  it  also  shows epistemic
harm that involves operating with falsely neutral (unlinked from values and interests)
and ahistorical notions of objectivity and truth. Fricker’s perspective, however, deals
primarily with the question of how identity-based harm interferes with the fixation
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and recognition of the subject of knowledge. From there, the author points out ethical/
political harm that, as in the previous case, is related to the survival of an unjust social
and political  order  due to  the  inequality  that  it  entails.  However,  Fricker  wants  to
highlight the importance of specifically epistemic harm, such as the waste of possible
knowledge that entails dispensing with groups whose credibility is devalued (Fricker
2007: 17), or those who are prevented from participating in practices through which
social meanings are generated (Fricker 2007: 6).
25 Epistemic  harm  would  be  a  crystallisation  of  what  we  are  calling  cognitive
vulnerability.
26 On  the  other  hand,  both  the  Frankfurt  and  Fricker  perspectives  highlight  a  close
relationship between knowledge and domination and/or,  if  I  may express it  on the
broadest conceptual level that I  am proposing here, between cognitive vulnerability
and a more general vulnerability that goes through social relations. 
27 If we look at this relationship, cognitive vulnerability seems to have degrees according
to human groups,  since the social  and political  damage that certain groups already
suffer  increase  their  risk  of  suffering  cognitive  dysfunctions.  That  is,  the  unequal
distribution of general vulnerability in social life feeds cognitive vulnerability and vice
versa.  In this respect,  it  is  not surprising that the two currents of thought develop
ethical  political  reflections  of  an  egalitarian  and  democratic  type,  which  have  an
impact to epistemological reflections. This connection between the epistemological and
the ethical-political fields takes on a different aspect according to the authors. In any
case, along these lines, it is worth remembering that also the pragmatist tradition of
thought and, in particular, Rorty’s philosophy, contain ethical/political reflections that
have an impact to epistemological ones. One of the greatest difficulties in all cases lies
in how the passage of vulnerability is recognised as a possibility of specific breakdown,
or what specific role epistemic and ethical/political elements play, and how they affect
each other. I will return to this topic later in Rorty’s work.12
28 Therefore, although neither the Kuhn nor the Frankfurtian analysis, nor that carried
out  by  Fricker,  address  the  problem  of  cognitive  vulnerability,  they  do  however
illustrate it. They also allow us to recognise continuity between cognitive and general
vulnerability. 
29 Focusing on the case of cognitive vulnerability, it should be added that, when it goes
from  being  a  possibility  to  a  reality,  it  certainly  leads  to  harm,  but  this  does  not
necessarily cancel out positive possibilities (as a radical sceptic might argue), given that
the cognitive dysfunctions are, in principle, as contingent as other human cognitive
outcomes. Cognitive dysfunctions can be of different types,13 as can the possibilities of
solving them, or the effects they generate. A theory that can be considered imprecise,
not very fruitful or even erroneous, for example, does not rule out the possibility of
elaborating more precise, more fruitful and more cognitive successful theories. Or, that
a certain human group (such as women) has been considered cognitively inferior for
centuries, but the possibility of seriously disrupting that opinion has not been ruled
out. That is, the actual implementation of cognitive vulnerability is not a reason for
epistemological pessimism nor for distrust of human rationality,  but a chance for a
better understanding of its dynamics.
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3. The Rorty Case
30 After making the previous conceptual clarifications, we can return to Rorty’s thinking
to show that it is a case of pessimistic fallibilism and cognitive vulnerability. 
31 Fallibilist philosophies usually reflect on fallibilism from an epistemological point of
view (about problems of objectivity, justification and truth) and then extend it to all
rational activity. Rorty, however, highlights the fallibilism from an ethical point of view
(regarding the priority of solidarity over objectivity) and then extends it to all rational
activities.
32 When Rorty speaks of fallibilism he does not mention the idea of error as much as the
ideas of objection, a change of vocabulary, or the emergence of some more ingenious
hypothesis.  Nevertheless,  it  always  relates  it  to  the  responsibility  of  the  possible
appearance  of  a  new audience  before  which  some of  the  justified  beliefs  now lose
justification (Rorty 2000a: 4). On the other hand, Rorty oscillates between considering
fallibilism either as a human characteristic of our general contingency, and a historical-
cultural  factor.  Thus,  in its  most epistemological  reflections,  fallibility is  a concrete
example of  the contingency that  affects  justification and truth.  However,  when his
reflections focus on issues that go from epistemology to political philosophy (such as
the relevance or not of truth to democratic politics), then fallibilism is a cultural factor:
“Such fallibilism is not, in fact, a feature of all human beings. It is much more prevalent
among inhabitants  of  wealthy,  secure,  tolerant,  inclusivist  societies  than elsewhere.
Those are the people who are brought up to bethink themselves that they might be
mistaken: that there are people out there who might disagree with them, and whose
disagreements need to be taken into account” (Rorty 2000a: 4). Perhaps to undo any
confusion  that  might  arise  from this, it  would  suffice  to  differentiate  between the
existential  characteristic  (natural  for  a  Darwinian  vocabulary  like  Rorty’s)  and  the
recognition of it.14
33 Based on this, I will now go on to explain that what distinguishes Rorty’s thinking is
that the cognitive vulnerability that we can link to his fallibilist position does not focus
so much on the permanent possibility of  error and the consequent impossibility of
achieving unconditional truths, as on the ethical objective of avoiding any relapse into
authoritarianism.
34 However, the path he follows produces an excess of cognitive vulnerability in Rorty’s
philosophy, which is evident when he addresses the question of how to determine the
best out of several theoretical options (or general, cultural belief systems) in conflict. It
is in relation to this issue when it becomes clear that his fallibilism is pessimistic, to the
point  of  sometimes  appearing  irrational,  relativistic,  antirealistic,  or  all  of  them
together. Rorty tried to stop this situation (with doubtful success) based on subjecting a
particular notion of truth and justification to the ethical background of his thinking.
35 Rorty’s fallibilism surely implies a complex notion of truth and its relationship with
justification. In his constant reflections on the subject he sometimes reduces truth to
justification, and critically argues that maintaining that the truth leads to justification
is the same as believing that,  in some way, we can go from the conditioned to the
unconditioned. In full conformity with the aforementioned negative logic of fallibilism,
Rorty argues that what we can aspire to is a justification before wider audiences, which
“leads to less and less danger of rebuttal” (Rorty 2000a: 12).
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36 Along with this, on other occasions he considers it useful to distinguish between truth
and  justification.  Moreover,  he  does  so  with  the  precise  intention  of  highlighting
fallibilism, in the sense that distinction makes it possible to accentuate the idea that
objections may arise to what at a certain moment is considered true, or to explain the
failures  we  find  at  a  certain  moment.15 However,  he  considers  that,  although  the
distinction is  useful,  that  does not  make it  essential,  since under no circumstances
would it allow us to decide what to believe (Rorty 1998: 19). 
37 Besides this, Rorty also exposes several uses (which are also notions) of truth:16
1. disquotational use;
2. use as consensus, as human dialogue;
3. use as a compliment;
4. the commendatory use, the truth as a recommendation;
5. cautionary use.
38 The latter is the one I want to highlight here since it gives a comprehensive view of
fallibility. This use of truth makes it equivalent to justification before a specific and
limited audience. To that extent, it acts as a warning of the contingency of its validity,
as another auditorium might not endorse it.
39 One of the risks that follows on immediately after this idea is that of a combination of
relativism and anti-realism. In this regard, Rorty constantly repeated that his proposal
is outside the classic and sterile dualisms such as the one this objection contains. To
make  it  even  clearer,  he  decided  to  describe  his  position  as  ethnocentric.  Such
denomination, among other aspects, referred to the fact that all truth and justification
are  established by  the  members  of  a  specific  audience  through  their  linguistic
interactions.  To  understand  this  better,  it  is  important  to  add  to  this  that  Rorty
explained this social interactivity through Davidson’s triangulation theory, or rather, a
certain interpretation of it. 
40 Far  from the risks  of  dualistic  approaches,  Rorty  finds  in  the triangle  proposed by
Davidson the vaccine against all metaphysical dogmatism and scepticism. The triangle
is composed of three vertices (speaker, interpreter and world) that cannot be conceived
atomically. It is also through this interaction, which includes the “world” vertex, that
the  reference  to  linguistic  expressions  can  be  accounted  for  outside
representationalism.  This  reference  is  not  the  result  of  a  mere  causal  relationship
(although  it  does  include  it),  but  arises  from  maximising  coherence  and  truth  in
interactions with others (Rorty 1991:  134 et sq.).  Along with this,  the interaction is
guided  by  what  Davidson,  inspired  by  Quine,  called  the  principle  of  interpretive
charity, which assumes that others are rational in what they do and say.
41 Rorty  partially  accepted  this  proposal.  He  accepted  it  because  he  adopted  the
Davidsonian notion of reference when he incorporated into his thinking the idea that
Davidson expressed in “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” In fact, he quoted
this affirmation by Davidson verbatim: “In giving up the dualism of scheme and world,
we  do  not  give  up  the  world,  but  re-establish  unmediated  touch with  the  familiar
objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false” (Rorty 1979: 310).
Thus, the theoretical goals of Rortyan linguistic pragmatism have always been clear:
there was no room for linguistic idealism.
42 But  that  acceptance  was  partial,  since  he  showed  his  disagreement  with  the
Davidsonian defence of a certain notion of truth as correspondence (Rorty 1991: 138).
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Against  this,  he  always  underlined the  aforementioned cautionary use  of  the  truth
(what may be justified for one audience may not be for another), thereby accentuating
the  fallibility  of  justification  and  truth  and,  to  this  extent,  of  what  we  are  calling
cognitive vulnerability. 
43 What Rorty did not seem to see is  that  the semantic  dimension of  the issue is  not
incompatible with cautionary use. In our interactions, from the most ordinary to the
most sophisticated, the use of truth as correspondence is continually present.17 What
we  are  talking  about  in  each  case  is,  thus,  understandable.  Furthermore,  this  is
perfectly compatible with maintaining a certain epistemological precaution regarding
its justification. In other words, caution affects justification, not the use of truth as
correspondence that is supported by reference. To consider, as Rorty does, that any use
of truth as correspondence is representational and foundationalist in the classical way
is to fall into one of those dualistic approaches that he criticized so much; or rather,
engaging  in  the  aforementioned  Cartesian  anxiety:  or  the  use  of  truth  as
correspondence understood in the classical way, or no use of truth as correspondence
at all.
44 It  must  also  be  added  that,  together  with  this  recognition  of  the  presence  of  the
“world” vertex in the reference setting and its limited scope in terms of the notion of
truth, a marked inoperativeness of said vertex is found in Rorty when he repeatedly
argues  against  any  idea  of  evidence,  that  is,  against  any  idea  of  experience  with
justification  functions.  This  problem  is  particularly  palpable  when  addressing  the
problem of choosing the best of several options in conflict.
45 Rorty understands the notion of evidence exclusively as a “given” objective scope and
with foundationalist epistemic functions. He rejects the role of experience as “felt or
had” in cognitive justification (Rorty 1979:  184).  He considers this  an invention,  an
appeal to gods, a metaphysical comfort, a recourse to magical mediators.18 Even in his
criticisms  of  essentialism  that  involves  any  representationalism in  his  opinion,  he
sustains  the  need  to  forget  about  that  “doubtful  interface”  that  is  perceptual
experience (Rorty 1991: 91). The alternative of proposing an anti-foundationalist notion
of evidence is the same for Rorty as when “the question, ‘Is there any evidence for p?’ 
gets replaced by the question, ‘Is there any way of getting a consensus on what would
count in favour of p?’” (Rorty 1999: 155).
46 Certainly, Rorty accepts that who, like himself, adopts the anti-essentialist position is
not  an  idealist,  but  a  coherentist,  since  he  admits  that  he  “is  no  more  free  from
pressure  from  outside”  and  “there  are  objects  which  are  causally  independent  of
human beliefs and desires” (Rorty 1991: 101). However, in the processes of justification,
he believes that the anti-essentialist coherentist like himself is only obliged to try to fit
some  new  belief  into  his  own  already-existing  network  of  beliefs.  So,  if  you  are  a
coherentist anti-essentialist, “then we shall say that all inquiry is interpretation, that
all thought consists in recontextualisation, that we have never done anything else and
never will” (Rorty 1991: 102). This is explicitly added to by total dissociation between
the  reference  –  which  can  be  explained  through  causal,  unintentional  and  non-
representational  links19 (Rorty  1991:  148)  –  and the  verificationist  justification that
resorts  to  evidence.  Otherwise,  one  falls  into  the  old  metaphysical  desire  for
correspondence between words and reality itself.
47 The critical dialogue between Rorty and Bjørn Ramberg is illustrative on this issue. The
latter, accepting like Rorty the basic ideas of Davidson’s triangulation theory, pointed
Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
9
out the need to admit the differential truth/error pair not only on the semantic level,
but  also  as  an  indispensable  element  of  the  intersubjective  linguistic  practices  of
justification. He also pointed out that these practices require the use of descriptive
vocabularies that show “something as a kind of thing. But this is just to say that any
linguistic utterance, as opposed to a mere noise, will have appropriateness-conditions”
(Ramberg  2000:  363).  The  importance  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  it  enables  the
reciprocal,  normative  evaluation  of  alternative  descriptions:  “Vocabularies  can  be
evaluated,  in  so  far  as  different  vocabularies  may  serve  different  purposes  and
interests.  But  human  purpose  and  interest  provide  both  the  framework  for
individuations of vocabularies,  and the ultimate terms of any evaluation” (Ramberg
2000: 365). 
48 Rorty’s response is positive and clearly affirms that “none of the three corners of his
process  of  triangulation  can  be  what  they  are  in  independence  of  the  other  two.”
However,  this  affirmation  is  preceded  by  another  one  that  once  again  identifies
correspondence with representation in the fundamentalist  sense:  “If  you think that
that glib and ethnocentric answer is not good enough, that is because you are still in
the grip of the scheme-content distinction. You think you can escape the inescapable,
cut  off  one  corner  of  Davidson’s  triangle,  and  just  ask  about  a  relation  called
‘correspondence’ or ‘representation’ between your beliefs and the world” (Rorty 2000c:
374).
49 The key to a better understanding of this answer lies in that same volume, but in the
response to Brandom. That is where he makes clear that the problem is not so much
the  truth/error  pair,  or  the  connection  between  description,  correspondence  and
evaluation, as the dogmatic,  authoritarian drift that arises from it:  “My fear is that
countenancing these dangerous idioms will be taken as a concession by the bad guys:
the people who still use perceptual experience as a model for ‘hard facts’ and who think
that  photon-talk  is  somehow  harder  than  talk  about  comparative  aesthetic  worth.
These bad guys are the people I think of as ‘authoritarians.’ These guys do not agree
with Brandom and myself that increased freedom and richness of the Conversation is
the aim of inquiry, but instead think that there is the further aim of getting Reality
right (as opposed to getting, for instance, snow, photons, baseball,  Cezanne and the
best use of the term ‘fact’ right)” (Rorty 2000b: 187).
50 To sum up, Rorty believes that the only alternative to his own position is the one that
handles an idea of evidence, of facts of the matter, or of experiential inputs, which
would  necessarily  imply  a  representationalist,  antipluralist,  essentialist,
fundamentalist and, in short, authoritarian dogmatic perspective. 
51 With regard to this issue, the first thing that can be said is that Rorty is once again the
prey of Cartesian anxiety, since he reasons in terms of extreme dualism: either one opts
for  his  coherentist  anti-essentialism  that  assimilates  justification  to
recontextualization, or a notion of evidence and perceptual experience is used that is
necessarily  essentialist  and  assimilates  justification  to  the  idea  of  absolute
metaphysical foundation, whose reflection in life is authoritarianism.
52 Once again we can see that his goal is clear: to avoid the authoritarianism that springs
from  foundationalist  representationalism.  We  can  see  also  that  he  is  creating  a
theoretical scenario in the service of that goal: a conversational, open, dynamic picture
of  rationality.  But  that  philosophical  scenario  is  missing  a  concept  that  captures
everyday  usage  –  “homely  and  shopworn”  (Rorty  1979:  307)  –  of  experience  or
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evidence. There is no reason to suppose, as Rorty does, that the philosophical use of
those terms in relation to justification necessarily entails an authoritarian notion of
experience or evidence. Even from a pragmatist point of view “for example, it could be
argued  that  a  pragmatism  oriented  to  the  ‘linguistic  turn’  can  only  profit  from  a
reconstruction  of  the  notion  of  experience;  instead  of  rejecting  it,  ‘linguistic
pragmatism’ should include the different shades of this notion that Peirce, James and
Dewey developed in their philosophies,  but avoiding as well  to suggest it  –  as they
sometimes seemed to do – as a foundationalist criterion” (Calcaterra 2019: 38).
53 Additionally,  if  we  think  about  controversial  situations,  the  result  of  this  Rortyan
conceptual  lacuna  would  be  that  to  forge  what  is  best  would  be  reduced  to  a
conversational  process  which  would  be  about  persuading  the  opponent,  that  is,
convincing him through arguments and reasons governed by solidarity, but without
decisive empirical charge.
54 Therefore,  epistemic  processes  of  justification  for  choosing  one  of  several  options
would become pure linguistic exchange between speakers and interpreters of one or
several ethnos, without a relevant role for the (Davidsonian) angle of the world.
55 In this  way,  Rorty takes cognitive vulnerability to the extreme, since his  fallibilism
becomes  greatly  pessimistic  because  it  lacks  of  any  notion of  experience  to  use  as
evidence to determine what is best to believe (always contingently) in relation to the
apex  of  the  world.  However,  as  indicated  above,  he  always  argued  that  his
ethnocentrism is not a relativism in which anything goes; it is possible to emerge from
disputes and establish the best among several options. How? Through a combination of
solidarity and imagination: imagining which option would be the best from the point of
view of “a better version of ourselves.”20 
56 The  “ourselves”  refers  to  Westerners,  liberals  and  moderates.  As  for  the  specific
meaning  of  the  adjective  “better”  (which  is  the  one  that  contains  the  burden  of
solidarity), Rorty includes it several times in his work21 and at the base of its meaning is
the pounding of an idea that William James presented in his work entitled The Will to
Believe (James 1912: 210), more specifically, the idea that it is necessary to be open to
listen to “the cries of the wounded” to increase our knowledge and sense of justice.
This reflection is integrated by Rorty in his characterisation of the figure of the ironist.
He therefore states that “she thinks that what unites her with the rest of the species is
not a common language but just susceptibility to pain and in particular to that special
sort of pain which the brutes do not share with the humans – humiliation” (Rorty 1989:
92 et sq.). 
57 Such  human  resemblance  in  pain  and  humiliation,  combined  with  his  notion  of
contingency  of  the  self,  of  every  human  community  and,  ultimately,  of  all  that  is
human,  can  easily  be  reformulated  as  our  similarity  with  regard  to  vulnerability
understood as an existential condition. In Rorty’s work there is no careful analysis of
the  concept  of  vulnerability,22 however,  in  his  way  of  presenting  the  notions  of
humiliation and solidarity we can see both a double sense of vulnerability in general
and its relationship with what we are now calling cognitive vulnerability. Indeed, it is
possible to reconstruct a notion of existential vulnerability with a negative sense, for
example, when he mentions human fear of pain and death, or the fear of not surviving
in some way after death that (in his opinion) exists in supporters of objectivity versus
solidarity (Rorty 1991: 31). However, his work also shows a glimpse of a positive sense
of  vulnerability  as  a  deep root  of  human contingency.23 The transformation of  this
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negative  charge  of  vulnerability  into  a  positive  one  requires  the  acceptance  of
contingency,  since  it  implies  (in  Rorty’s  eyes)  a  dynamic  opening  to  others,  their
expressions and their belief systems (this is the field of cognitive vulnerability). In fact,
it is an opening that is always driven by the ethical ideal of solidarity. 
Furthermore, in this same conceptual framework, Rorty relies on linking the private
and public sphere of human lives through their respective ethical requirements. He
therefore  links,  on the one hand,  the value of  self-creation of  the individual  in  its
uniqueness  and,  on  the  other,  the  value  of  social  solidarity,  which  he  considers
inherent  to  any  democratic  political  project  that  deserves  that  name,  and  to  any
activity that wishes to contribute to that project (starting with science and philosophy).
Even so, Rorty bases the norms of all rational interaction on a democratic social ethics
developed on the existential background of vulnerability.
In  short,  to  alleviate  the  pessimistic  consequences  of  an  extreme  development  of
cognitive vulnerability, which stem from his rejection of any notion of evidence, Rorty
resorts  to  an  optimistic  idea  of  an  improved  future  “us,”  whose  meaning  depends
ultimately  on  understanding  vulnerability  as  an  existential  condition  common  to
humans. 
In this regard, I will first merely point out that Rorty does not clarify how his notion of
an “improved us” avoids being another case of metaphysical comfort, or rather, why
his utopia is less metaphysical than, for example, the idea of truth as convergence.
Certainly his utopian “better versions of ourselves” does not rely on any necessary a
priori need, and is a hope that goes from the present to the future, but that does not
prevent its character of counterfactual utopia, of invention. 
Secondly, this part of Rortyan thought once again clearly shows the antidogmatic and
antiauthoritarian goals that guide the author. It is also apparent that in the structure of
his  theory  the  hopeful  optimism  associated  with  the  concept  pair  vulnerability-
solidarity has the task of balancing the excessive pessimism entailed by his notion of
fallibilism without evidence. But it is not successful, as we can see in the effects derived
from the theory. 
No doubt those effects were not sought or hoped for by Rorty himself, since throughout
his voluminous work he repeated in a thousand different ways that he did not intend to
alter the ordinary way of using “knowing,” “objective,” “fact,” and “reason,” but only
the comments that inherited philosophy made about that mode of speech (Rorty 1998:
44). That is, he distinguished between the ordinary use of those terms and the abusive
use made by the philosophical traditions that enthroned privileged descriptions. As we
have stated in this text, the reason (the goal) that moved him was to avoid at all costs
the authoritarianism that inherited tradition entails. 
58 However,  the  Cartesian  anxiety  present  in  his  philosophy  leads  to  unsought
consequences that do alter the ordinary way of speaking. Or to say it more clearly, his
philosophical project becomes disconnected from ordinary speech. Despite his laudable
goals,  the  structure  of  Rortyan  thought  has  a  conceptual  lacuna  that  makes  it
impossible to reflect philosophically on an epistemic activity (the activity of adducing
or  requesting  evidence)  that  is  a  normal  part  of  conversational  exchanges  such as
controversies.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Rortyan  proposal  has  as  an  unexpected
consequence, which is the aggravating factor of blocking the path to deal with such
serious phenomena as the spread of post-truth, of “alternative facts.”
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59 In controversial situations (from the simplest to the most complex), we constantly use
descriptive  languages  and  truth  as  correspondence,  and  distinguish  between
appearance and reality. Furthermore, in argumentative exchanges we forge empirical
evidence  to  support  our  reasons.  We  sometimes  do  all  this  by  adding  some
metaphysical counterfactual, and on other occasions we don’t. If only for this reason,
philosophy cannot ignore the (semantic) question of reference and its link with truth as
correspondence and the (epistemic) question of evidence, as if any possible notion of
them were immediately false idols. In the ordinary way of speaking, both are closely
related  and,  therefore,  must  be  rethought  taking  into  account  human  cognitive
vulnerability. The semantic dimension of what we say acquires (or does not acquire)
epistemic  evidential  value  in  argumentative  exchanges  themselves,  which  are
undoubtedly interlinked with interpretation. But, an argumentative exchange without
a semantic dimension is mere fiction and, in the worst case, lies and manipulation (as
when talking about  alternative  facts).  To  this  extent,  it  is  ineffective  in  combating
authoritarianism.
60 The concept pair vulnerability/solidarity is fundamental to all conversational activity,
since (as we have said) it entails dynamic openness towards others, to what they say
and to their systems of belief. As such, the concept pair affects our judgements and
reasoning by the ethical implications that it  entails.24 However, ethical and political
reasons do not replace and do not deactivate the value of epistemic reasons although
they do combine and reinforce each other. That is, ethical and political reasons do not
change  reality,  although  they  change  our  concepts,  our  way  of  seeing  it  and
establishing what counts as evidence. For example, an understanding of gender-based
violence includes ethically despicable acts (such as that a husband murders his wife
when  she  wants  a  divorce)  that  at  other  times  have  been  considered  ethically
acceptable (by virtue of a code of honour). Here we have a single event (someone takes
the  life  of  another)  seen  as  despicable  in  one  case  and  honourable  in  another.25
Whether  it  is  in  the  end  evidence  of  murder  or  evidence  of  honour  restored  is
something that can be explained by, for example, that branch of philosophy that is the
argumentation  theory.  In  effect,  whether  we  are  disposed  to  see  it  in  one  way  or
another in a controversial situation passes through a conversational exchange in which
we use every kind of argument, that is, ethical and emotional arguments too.26 But the
ethical force of an argument cannot replace its empirical force. 
61 Whether  following  this  theoretical-argumentative  path  (with  Wittgensteinian
background), whether through linguistic pragmatism (mentioned above), we can see
that there is room in philosophy for the development of a concept of evidence outside
of the category of necessity. We can see that evidence can be understood from within
philosophy as something hammered out in language through conversational exchanges
in which solidarity is also central. 
62 The ethical interest that guides Rorty’s pragmatism is embodied with the brilliance that
characterized him in a well-known statement that became his motto: “If we take care of
freedom, truth can take care of itself” (Rorty 1989: 176). However, there are several
vocabularies  about  freedom,  and  we  have  (contingent)  evidence  that  those  that
trivialise the truth involve authoritarianism. That is why it is necessary to take care of
both at the same time; they nicely complement each other.
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NOTES
1. Rorty derives important epistemological ideas from this, one being that distinction between
knowledge  is  not  essential.  The  distinction  between  sociology  and  physics,  for  example,  is
sociological,  not  methodological.  They  simply  constitute  different  vocabularies  (Rorty  1991:
102-3). So, all knowledge becomes understood as voices in conversation of humankind guided by
solidarity (and not by objectivity).
2. Error  and  doubt  may  arise  both  from  faculties,  judgments  and  all  the  technical  support
equipment involved in rational activities. 
3. I use the expression “soft rationality” to refer to an image of rationality that is dynamic in
epistemological terms, since it conceives knowledge and action as qualitatively plastic, open and
flexible  social  activities.  It  produces  plural  and  contingent  results,  since  they  are  always
empirically underdetermined. However, at the same time, it is an image that contains limits for
that plurality,  since it  is minimally although not a priori normative. I  developed this idea in
Perona (2016).
4. Javier Vilanova justifiably defends the need for epistemology to go from discussing infallibility
to  discussing  successability:  “We  must  stop  traumatising  ourselves  due  to  the  difficulty,
complexity and scarcity of knowledge and start examining the factors that lead us, even in spite
of so many impediments, to reach that desired situation that we believe; we have reasonable
justifications and, above all (even if it is some sort of luck), what we believe corresponds to the
facts” (Vilanova 2015: 166).
5. Popper ended up contradicting this. On the one hand, he always maintained the idea that truth
is an unattainable regulatory ideal, in the sense that we cannot know that any of our theories (or
part of them) are true, even if they are; only their contingent corroboration or verisimilarity can
be  found.  However,  the  contradiction  came  from  his  attempts  to  establish  the  degree  of
verisimilarity of a theory, which transformed his notion of verisimilarity into a sort of percentual
approach to the truth.
6. I dealt with that debate in Perona (2018).
7. For a more current realistic proposal see the work of Tim Williamson, for example. 
Pessimistic Fallibilism and Cognitive Vulnerability
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XII-1 | 2020
15
8. This concept was introduced by Óscar González Castán to explain situations that go beyond
mere fallibilism: “However, children’s discovery of their absolute cognitive vulnerability is not
the same thing as the discovery of their fallibilism. Rather it is the discovery that, previous to
any use of limited and fallible cognitive faculties and previous to any scientific hypothesis or to
any sophisticated idea, their lives have been permeated by beliefs and behaviours of an absolute
certainty but, nevertheless, of an absolutely empty certainty. […] These second order epistemic
beliefs might give us a permanent sense of vulnerability and distrust. They give us a sense of
deepness  and  despair  because  we  can  no  longer  have  an  absolutely  confident  cognitive
relationship  with  any  of  our  beliefs,  with  the  world,  and,  in  fact,  with  ourselves.  Sceptical
philosophy  has  biographical  roots”  (González  Castán  2013:  29-30).  See  below  for  further
information on this concept: Vilanova (2019) and Gamero (2019).
9. Cf.  Beck  et  al. (1979).  However,  there  are  other  psychological  currents  that,  aside  from
pathological cases that require psychiatric treatment, offer a less negative image of cognitive
vulnerability. Specifically, in therapies that use negotiation it is considered that there is nothing
pathological in itself or anything curative in itself, but rather an imbalance that causes problems.
Therapy consists of detecting the problem and negotiating the reestablishment of equilibrium
with patients. I would like to thank José Mª Ariso for this clarification.
10. On this issue, it is worth mentioning a huge bibliography that goes from the opening text of
Max Horkheimer Traditionelle und kritische Theorie to the emblematic book by Jürgen Habermas
Erkenntnis und Interesse.
11. On this same page the author illustrates her notions with these examples: “An example of the
first might be that the police do not believe you because you are black; an example of the second
might be that you suffer sexual harassment in a culture that still lacks that critical concept.”
12. I am not going to analyse here the way in which this relationship is specified in Fricker’s
work or in the work of Frankfurtians like Habermas, because it goes well beyond the boundaries
of this work.
13. In relation to the general notion of vulnerability, it would be interesting to explore whether
harm can be discussed on its own, or that the fact that what constitutes harm depends on each
social context. However, this goes well beyond the boundaries of this text.
14. Rorty  does  not  make  an  analysis  of  this  question,  but  he  does  choose  the  theoretical
framework that he considers most useful to talk about human contingency at all levels, that is,
Darwinism. But it is important to insist that Darwinism for Rorty is a vocabulary. To that extent
it is not a kind of first philosophy we can use to discover the essence of human nature; but it is
rather a way of speaking that portrays an image of human beings. The approach is deeply anti-
essentialist, but does not exclude the possibility of talking about existential conditions, since the
difference between the latter and essences is valid.
15. This is the case, for example, when he states the following: “In non-philosophical contexts,
the point of contrasting truth and justification is simply to remind oneself that there may be
objections (arising from newly discovered data, or more ingenious explanatory hypotheses, or a
shift  in the vocabulary used for describing the objects under discussion) which have not yet
occurred to anyone” (Rorty 2000a: 4).
16. Rorty exposes these uses repeatedly throughout all his works, but perhaps the best places to
get an overview are “Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth” (Rorty 1991: 126-50) and “Is Truth a Goal
of Inquiry? Donald Davidson versus Crispin Wright?” (Rorty 1998: 19-42).
17. A  use  that  is  not  always  supported  by  the  representation  understood  from  the  visual
metaphor of the mirror. It is often an instrumental representation like that of a blind person
with his cane.
18. Cf.,  for example, the criticism of the notions that Hilary Putnam handles of “experiential
inputs” or, subsequently, “a matter of fact” (Rorty 1998: 43-62). There Rorty did not capture the
relevance of  the fact  that  in Reason,  Truth  and History Putnam made it  clear  that  he did not
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understand inputs beyond conceptual-linguistic structures: “[…] it does deny that there are any
inputs which are not themselves to some extent shaped by our concepts, by the vocabulary we use to
report  and describe  them,  or  any inputs  which  admit  of  only  one  description,  independent  of  all
conceptual choices” (Putnam 1981: 54).
19. Rorty  believes  that  the  aforementioned  Darwinian  vocabulary  is  especially  useful  for
explaining the type of causal (non-representational) relationships that human animals have with
the surrounding world. Cf. Rorty (1998: 47 et sq.).
20. According to Rorty, this possibility does not imply that emergence is always satisfactory from
the point of view of the moral parameters of the tolerant, liberal, etc., us. An example of this is in
the long debate he had with Putnam and, in particular, in his Darwinist response to the question
that Putnam asks him about what he would call upon to present as a normatively unacceptable a
hypothetical triumph of the Nazi form of life. In his opinion, in those circumstances “I cannot,
indeed, appeal to such a ‘fact of the matter,’ any more than a species of animal that is in danger
of losing its ecological niche to another species, and thus faces extinction, can find a ‘fact of the
matter’ to settle the question of which species has the right to the niche in question” (Rorty 1998:
51).  This  response  is  consistent  with  his  idea  (already  mentioned  before)  of  fallibilism  as  a
historical-cultural factor that not all human groups include; the belief system of the world image
of the Nazi does not contemplate the possibility of the fallibility of its own beliefs. This certainly
prevents the exchange of reasons and arguments to resolve the confrontation between life forms
and their corresponding belief system. 
21. For example, in Rorty (1998: 51 et sq.).
22. His  work contains  some uses  of  the  concept,  for  example,  in  “Religion as  Conversation-
stopper,” he says that we have vulnerable bodies (Rorty 1999: 169).
23. See Calcaterra (2019) to capture the centrality in Rorty’s thinking of his complex notion of
contingency.
24. In  all  these  arguments,  the  key  idea  is  that  we  cannot  resort  to  any  authority  besides
ourselves and other human beings. This is what Richard Bernstein refers to when he talks about
Rorty’s “Deep Humanism” (Bernstein 2010: 211).
I am not going to discuss here the question of why Rorty, who is always so critical of inherited
tradition, sees it necessary to reintroduce some version of humanism and universalism. I will
only  mention  that  the  reasons  are  political  and  ethical  (strengthen  cosmopolitanism  and
democratic politics as ways to reduce pain and humiliation) and that, for him, universality would
be something that can be created gradually,  but not something previously existing. Cf.  Rorty
(2000a: 17). 
25. I understand “to see as” in the sense used by the later Wittgenstein. Note that it implies a
pluralism of human perspectives and never a “God’s eye” view perspective.
26. Cf. Walton (1992). This book is particularly interesting in relation to the question that we are
addressing,  because  among  other  things  it  categorizes  evidence  by  different  notions  (hard
evidence, soft evidence, source-based evidence, etc.).
ABSTRACTS
In this text, the relationship between fallibilism and cognitive vulnerability is examined using
Richard Rorty’s thinking as an example. First, some of Rorty’s central ideas are collected and
commented on, especially the substitution of objectivity for solidarity, since it affects relevant
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issues  of  epistemology  and  of  reflection  on  rationality.  Next,  the  notions  of  fallibilism  and
cognitive vulnerability are examined, which will  be connected to an existential  dimension of
vulnerability.  Examples  of  all  those  things  are  also  given  from  Rorty’s  thinking  and  it  is
highlighted that the author operates with both a negative and a positive sense of existential
vulnerability. It is then stated that Rorty’s proposal implies pessimistic fallibilism and an excess
of  cognitive  vulnerability.  First,  it  is  argued  that  the  cause  of  this  lies  in  the  fact  that  his
approach is imprisoned in what Richard Bernstein called Cartesian anxiety and secondly, this
generates unwanted consequences for the Rortyan goals themselves to raise his ethnocentric
proposal as a non-relativistic alternative to realism and authoritarianism. In this respect, it is
maintained that the priority that Rorty attributes to solidarity is accompanied by the rejection of
any notion of evidence. This produces a conceptual lacuna in the structure of his thought that
makes it impossible to reflect philosophically on an epistemic activity (the activity of adducing or
requesting evidence) that is a normal part of day-to-day conversational exchanges as important
as controversies to determine the best option in each case. In response, we will argue that one
can better work towards the achievement of Rortyan goals if we bear in mind that reasons based
on solidarity do not replace and do not deactivate the value of epistemic reasons, although they
do combine and reinforce each other.
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